By Olarinre Salako
The departure of Adebayo Adelabu as Minister of Power presents an opportunity for structural reset in a sector long managed through incremental adjustment rather than deliberate redesign.
The word “Penkelemesi”—“peculiar mess”—popularized by Adelabu’s grandfather—aptly describes Nigeria’s power sector. From recurring grid collapses to chronic underperformance, it remains a study in systemic dysfunction.
From Recommendation to Reality
When Adebayo Adelabu assumed office on August 16, 2023, I urged him to confront this “Penkelemesi” with structural clarity.
Over two and a half years on, it is appropriate to assess progress.
First, the Siemens Electrification Roadmap. I recommended a review of the Siemens-backed electrification roadmap launched in 2018 to scale supply toward 25,000 MW by 2025, alongside the public communication of a revised delivery timeline. The project remains central to grid expansion. Progress, however, remains incremental. The gap is not activity but execution discipline. Without a clear timeline, it risks remaining aspirational.
Second, transmission and grid resilience. I emphasized that transmission must function as a strategic backbone. There has been increased attention through donor-supported upgrades and policy initiatives such as the Grid Asset Management Company (GAMCO). However, GAMCO risks duplicating the roles of the Transmission Company of Nigeria and the Nigerian Independent System Operator. The grid remains fragile, prone to system-wide disturbances, and a single point of failure. Recurring grid collapses—running into double digits under Adelabu—confirm systemic instability. Structural reform of transmission has yet to begin.
Third, energy–industrial integration. I advised aligning electricity policy with a broader energy–industrial framework. However, integration between electricity planning and industrial strategy remains weak. Power supply is still treated as a sectorial issue, not a driver of industrial growth. A disconnect persists between generation, transmission, and productive consumption. Industrial users are exiting the grid—diverting capital from production into electricity self-generation. This exit deepens the sector’s liquidity crisis by removing its most creditworthy customers.
Fourth, incentives and enforcement. I argued for measurable incentives alongside enforceable penalties across the value chain. The national metering rate rose from 46.57% in December 2024 to 57.27% by December 2025. The sector continues to operate within a fragile liquidity framework, characterized by payment shortfalls, weak enforcement, and government bailouts. These are most visible in estimated billing, low consumer trust, and weak revenue collection. A market that cannot measure consumption cannot enforce discipline.
Fifth, federal–state collaboration under the Electricity Act 2023. I called for leveraging the Electricity Act to drive coordinated federal–state collaboration. The amendment to the Act represents progress in decentralizing electricity governance. However, progress remains emergent. The absence of a national integration framework risks fragmentation and power islanding. The true potential of the Act lies in enabling federal–state and state–state collaborations to achieve economies of scale. Decentralization without integration risks replacing one fragile grid with many isolated—and costly—systems.
Sixth, energy mix and the energy trilemma. I recommended that all energy sources be strategically developed within the framework of the energy trilemma—availability, affordability, and sustainability._ Nigeria relies heavily on gas-fired generation, accounting for roughly 80 percent of supply, alongside hydro. Diversification into renewables at utility scale remains limited. Policy recognizes the trilemma; implementation lags. Generation companies face gas shortages, infrastructure vulnerabilities, and mounting debts. While gas remains a transition fuel, diversification remains insufficient for load management, grid resilience, and long-term energy security. Reliance on a single dominant fuel source—no matter the size of its reserves—is not a strategy but vulnerability.
Seventh, gas-to-power coordination. I proposed systemic inter-ministerial coordination between the power and gas sectors. Recent efforts include the Gas-to-Power Monitoring Committee inaugurated on April 9, 2026. However, as argued two weeks ago in this column, such committees often compensate for institutional fragmentation rather than resolve it. Coordination remains reactive, with no single point of accountability. The recurrence of committees reflects unresolved system design.
Eighth, global benchmarking and cost realism. I advised comparative analysis of residential, commercial and industrial electricity tariffs across advanced and emerging economies to extract useful lessons for Nigeria. Tariff reforms have moved toward cost-reflective pricing. Yet structured benchmarking has not been institutionalized as a transparent tool for guiding long-term pricing and investment decisions.
These were not isolated recommendations, but interdependent elements of a single system design—each reinforcing the other, and none sufficient on its own.
The President’s Struggle with Reality
Nothing better reveals the President’s underestimation of the power sector challenge than his campaign promise in December 2022. He said: “Whichever way, by all means necessary, you will have electricity, and you will not pay for estimated bill anymore. A promise made will be a promise kept. If I don’t keep the promise and I come for a second time, don’t vote for me. Unless I give you adequate reasons why I couldn’t deliver”.
As another election cycle approaches, the minister tasked with delivery has exited to pursue his own gubernatorial ambition. His attention had been divided between managing a collapsing national grid and coordinating his political base in Oyo State. The President is reactive, attributing failures to past administration decisions. On April 16, 2026, he told his campaign coordinators: “We have leaders who have privatized electricity that is not working. They gave us darkness.”
Yet, the same President told Nigerians at his inauguration dinner on May 28, 2023: “Don’t pity me. I asked for the job. I campaigned for it. No excuses.” Candidate Tinubu in 2022 made a bold promise—one that, in retrospect, overestimated what could realistically be delivered within a single term. At inauguration, however, he acknowledged a central truth: government is a continuum.
But as he now prepares to seek a renewal of the people’s mandate, that principle appears to be under strain. The reality of governance is that leadership inherits both the assets and the liabilities of prior administrations. In the same April 16, 2026 address to his Renew Hope Ambassadors, he stated: “I took over from myself. The late Buhari is me; he was a partner. If I took over from him, is that not from myself?”
These statements reflect a tension between expectation and reality. The earlier underestimation of the power sector challenge, the disconnection of Aso Rock Villa from the national grid, and the recent attribution of the crisis to past privatization decisions signal a presidency struggling with a deep-seated problem.
I do not pity the President; I empathize with the weight of the responsibility he bears.
The Next Agenda
There is merit in the argument that the 2013 privatization created a structural imbalance that continues to define the system today. Generation and distribution were transferred to private operators—many of them undercapitalized—while transmission remained under government control, resulting in a fractured value chain lacking coordination and fiscal discipline.
Adelabu was right, in his resignation letter, to propose the recapitalization of distribution companies. But that alone is insufficient. Generation companies also require recapitalization, while the transmission company should transition to a public–private partnership.
Without vertical integration across generation, transmission, and distribution, the system will continue to exhibit bottlenecks, opacity in financial flows, subsidy inefficiencies, and weak payment discipline.
He also recommended the appointment of a coordinating Minister of Energy. In practice, such coordination resides with the President, who must ensure alignment across power, gas, and broader energy and industrial policy, supported by capable multidisciplinary advisers.
Nigeria’s electricity crisis reflects fragmented design, weak coordination, and incomplete reform. The next phase must move beyond isolated interventions to deliberate system redesign. Electricity underpins industrialization and must be integrated into the energy system. The presidency must act with clarity in appointing a new Minister of Power. Nigeria does not lack policy ideas; it lacks system coherence. Until that coherence is achieved, interventions will continue, committees will recur, and the system will remain trapped in managed dysfunction.
Also Published in The Nigerian Tribune: Systems and Society. April 27, 2026
